

[REDACTED]

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

[REDACTED]

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

[REDACTED]

10 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment *3cc*

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Near East  
and South Asia

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting of 7 March - "Security Framework"

1. Action Requested: None; for your information. (U)
2. Background: This was the fourth in a series of SCC meetings on Security Framework. Next in the series will be a Mini-SCC on Tuesday, 11 March and the fifth SCC meeting on Thursday, 13 March. [REDACTED] (c)
3. Pakistan. Christopher reported briefly on what the Pak rejection of the US military aid package meant (i.e. that although the aid proposal was effectively dead, some Pak purchases of US military equipment are possible). Much discussion ensued on the approach we should now take with the Paks. Brzezinski wants to get clarification of the Pak position -- what it means -- and to be firm with them to ensure they understand the effects of their (damaging) statements. State is to prepare a non paper developing the approach to the Paks. The DCI proposed as an alternative approach [REDACTED] idea of US development of self-sufficiency for the Pak arms industry. Secretary Brown said we had already offered this to the Paks but that they had rejected it. Significantly increasing the size of the aid package is viewed as a non-starter (on the Hill), although everyone acknowledged that a large enough aid offer probably would interest the Paks in at least reopening negotiations. [REDACTED]
4. MAU Exercise. An incremental or "stair-step" approach recommended by the JCS was approved: No exercises this first time around. Start with port visits and eventually increase activities and presence (visits of

small units of the MAU ashore, some helicopters ashore, etc.) until exercises were reached. DoD apparently feels that it is at least arguable that a MAU exercise in Egypt could help Sadat rather than hurt him. They are hoping, however, to at some point receive a request from the Egyptian military for a joint exercise (instead of such an exercise being seen as Egyptian acquiescence to a US political request). Ports in Kenya, Somalia, and Egypt will probably be visited by the current MAU (only one or two ships per port). There was agreement with the DCI's point that Oman is one of the least preferred states for port visits because of the Sultan's already exposed position in supporting the US.

5.

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6. Afghanistan Neutralization Proposal. Option #2 was adopted. Brzezinski suggested we talk to our allies to more substantively define non-alignment (or neutralization or whatever the term) and to determine how to get there (timing/stages). The DCI suggested that a new option, which was missing from the list: that we discourage our allies from pursuing these various neutralization schemes since they are having the effect of encouraging the Soviets in Afghanistan (i.e. the appearance of the divided allies falling all over themselves rushing to Moscow to negotiate). Secretary Brown agreed but felt it was already too late to adopt this approach. Brzezinski, too, agreed with the DCI's point but somehow believed that Option #2 was not incompatible -- i.e. that the same end would be accomplished when the allies realized that neutralization isn't possible after they answer all the objective and modality questions we put to them in Option #2.

7.

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8. The agenda items for the 13 March SCC are:

(b)(c)

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. The Duncan trip and proposals;
- c. An Internal Security Program for Saudi Arabia  
[REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED]

9. Bill Odum, the notetaker at the SCC, suggested in a post-meeting conversation that the report on the program in Saudi Arabia take the following form:

- a. A status report [REDACTED] on the counter-  
terrorism program resulting from the earlier [REDACTED]
- b. A plan for an internal security survey in March or April (so as not to duplicate existing programs).
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. DoD suggestions on what they can do (e.g. on defense planning). Odum suggested that we coordinate with Frank Kramer in OSD for this portion of the report. (S)

10. [REDACTED]

(b)(c)